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THE HISTORY OF CONTINGENCY AND THE
CONTINGENCY OF HISTORY
Stephan Landsman*
INTRODUCTION
Peter Karsten has given us something of a revolutionary view of the
history of the contingency fee. As he notes early in his article, most
legal historians have located the birth of the contingency arrangement
in the waning decades of the nineteenth century.' This dating suggests
that contingency is tied to the values and disputes of that era, a time
when the tort system was developing its modern character,2 when la-
bor and capital were locked in conflict 3 and when an aggressive group
of first and second generation Americans was struggling to make their
way in a legal profession that was intensely hostile to their intrusion. 4
Each of these late nineteenth century events has offered modern com-
mentators a vantage from which to criticize contingency. If contin-
gency fees are an offshoot of modern tort law, then they may be
challenged as one of the attributes of that system in need of an over-
haul as we revamp and reform the way we go about compensating
victims for their injuries. If contingency is the product of disputes be-
tween labor and capital, it may be denigrated as a partisan mechanism
that is no longer needed in a fairer and more prosperous society. If
contingency is the result of the hustling and scraping of newly minted
lawyers, it may be condemned as unprofessional and in the worst tra-
ditions of the bar.
Moving the date of the rise of the contingency fee back at least a
half century (and probably more) undercuts much of the challenge
from history. The earlier dating suggests that contingency strategies
* Robert Clifford Chair and Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law; J.D.,
Harvard University. An earlier version of this Comment was presented at the Third Annual
Clifford Seminar on Tort Law and Social Policy, addressing Contingency Fee Financing of Litiga-
tion in America, Chicago, Illinois, April 4-5, 1997.
1. See Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of
Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231, 231 (1998).
2. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 409-27 (1973).
3. See generally PAUL AVRICH, THE HAYMARKET TRAGEDY (1984) (discussing the riot be-
tween labor supporters and police that occurred in Chicago in 1886).
4. See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE
IN MODERN AMERICA (1976) (discussing the development of the legal profession).
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were with us as the American legal system was taking on its identity,
are woven into the very fabric of our system and reflect some of our
most basic values, not later excrescences. It suggests that our concern,
from the earliest times, in such cases as those involving title disputes,
tax questions, inheritance and patent claims, has been to guarantee
that both rich and poor will have access to the courts and will be as-
sured an opportunity to avail themselves of the assistance of counsel.
De-coupling contingency from the late nineteenth century places a
sharper focus on the question of access. It identifies contingency strat-
egies as a particularly American response to that problem, a response
relying on private initiative and market forces rather than government
largess. It bespeaks faith in a robustly individualistic adversarial sys-
tem where each side is given an opportunity to make its strongest case
and, in essence, "put its money where its mouth is."
I. THE ENGLISH BACKGROUND
As with so many attributes of our system of adjudication, the con-
tingency fee story begins in England. There, from the thirteenth cen-
tury on, we find specific statutory enactments against such offenses as
champerty, or the financing of litigation by taking a share in the recov-
ery.5 By the seventeenth century, three alleged plagues upon the
legal system-champerty, barratry and maintenance-were being reg-
ularly excoriated. 6 What are we to make of England's stern response
to a sharing of risk and reward between counsel and client?
The frequency and vehemence of the English denunciation of cham-
perty and its cousins suggests that risk sharing did take place and that,
the royal judges' criticisms notwithstanding, it played a significant role
in English legal activity, especially that conducted by solicitors (the
practitioners who had direct contact with clients). Solicitors seldom
occupied lofty positions on the high court bench or in Parliament.
Those places were reserved for barristers whose fees were tendered in
advance and who seldom had contact with clients or responsibility for
the initiation of litigation.7 It is not surprising that the highly placed
might frown upon the practices of those less well off or less powerful
than themselves.
5. See Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or a Mar-
ket for Champerty?, 71 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 625, 639 & n.62 (1964) (citing a statute of Westmin-
ster I of 1275).
6. See Karsten, supra note 1, at 232-33.
7. For a historical description of the arrangement of legal work in England, see generally
RAYMOND COCKS, FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODERN BAR (1983).
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It was frequently alleged in England that contingency arrangements
were a danger because they might encourage feudal lords and mag-
nates to abuse the system in furtherance of the pursuit of power and
property.8 There is at least a bit of evidence that the wealthy did en-
gage in or encourage litigation designed to undermine neighbors. For
example, the 1742 murder prosecution of the nobly born James An-
nesley was organized and supported by a highly placed aristocrat. 9
Such cases were, however, rare. I believe there were other, more
powerful, motives for English efforts against contingency agreements.
By far the most important of these was a growing antipathy among the
upper classes to litigation, especially if mounted by plaintiffs of mod-
est means. The theme of curtailing access to court echoes through
English legal history. It is perhaps most prominent in England's adop-
tion of a "loser pays" rule whereby the defeated litigant is required to
pay not only the judgment (if there is one) but the attorney fees of his
victorious opponent as well as his own fees.' 0 Such an arrangement
substantially increases the risks associated with litigation and inhibits
access except for the wealthy or extremely courageous. Something of
the same attitude toward access is visible in the coal mine cases Peter
Karsten cites, where clear statutory violations and sympathetic claims
by widows and orphans are thwarted by contingency fee barriers."
II. COLONIAL AND POST-REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA
American attitudes towards litigation were quite different from
those exhibited by the English. Alexis de Tocqueville observed that in
early nineteenth century America virtually every serious question
eventually became a legal case. 12 Such a tradition bespeaks both re-
ceptivity to litigation and facilitation of access-a far cry from the atti-
tudes manifested in the mother country. Americans also rejected
English reticence about the right to counsel. In the criminal sphere,
from before the time of the drafting of the Constitution, Americans
insisted that those accused of a felony had a right to counsel. The
Sixth Amendment specifically preserves this right from abridgement
and, as the Supreme Court observed in Powell v. Alabama, virtually
every state among the original thirteen embraced the idea that those
8. See Painter, supra note 5, at 639 n.63.
9. See Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eight-
eenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 545 (1990) (citation omitted).
10. See John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule of Attorney Fee Recovery, 47
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 12 (1984).
11. See Karsten, supra note 1, at 233.
12. 1 ALEXiS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Henry Reeve trans., Alfred
A. Knopf, Inc. 1945) (1835).
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accused of a serious crime have a right to the assistance of a lawyer. 13
By contrast, in this period the English refused to recognize any such
right. It was not until 1836 that a right to counsel in felony proceed-
ings was accepted in England. 14
The American acceptance of ideas about easy access and the value
of counsel were signaled on the civil side by the resounding rejection
of the "loser pays" principle. Burdens on access were thus cast aside
in favor of allowing litigants a day in court. Americans embraced not
only the idea that citizens should have free access to their courts but
that lawyers are an important resource to which citizens should have
recourse. The high value placed on counsel was remarked by De Toc-
queville in the 1830s. 15 Moreover, those who triumphed in the court-
room, from Adams and Hamilton to Webster and Lincoln, were
widely celebrated and revered.
III. INSIGHTS FROM THE EARLY AMERICAN CONTINGENCY CASES
The early history of the contingency fee provides a number of im-
portant insights. It is interesting to observe that 175 years ago judicial
critics were using virtually the same rhetoric about contingency fees as
critics use today. For many in both groups the key risk alleged to arise
because of contingency is a flood of litigation. This rhetoric has had a
hollow ring since the beginning of the Republic. Unmanageable
"floods" of lawsuits have, upon investigation, usually proven to be a
chimera. 16 Moreover, the fact that there are more legitimate claims is
no calamity but an indication of a societal need that deserves to be
met. The real issue is not the quantity of litigation but our view about
access. Do we want a system open to all comers or one whose doors
are closed to the vast majority? We may legitimately choose social
repose over litigiousness but this decision should be made candidly
after a debate focused on the real issues.
The old cases provide some very useful insights about the real
problems of contingency, including unconscionably large fees and an
excessive shifting of control (especially over questions like settlement)
from litigant to counsel. These are difficulties that have dogged the
system from its beginnings and deserve our careful consideration. In a
13. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61-65 (1932) (stating that 12 out of 13 original colo-
nies rejected the English common law and recognized the right to counsel).
14. Id. at 60.
15. 1 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 12, at 272-80.
16. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA
L. REv. 4, 69-71 (1983).
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contingency fee system, methods must be developed to discourage
lawyer over-reaching while preserving the widest opportunity for
access.
Peter Karsten's history tells us that contingency fees are as Ameri-
can as apple pie. They have been embraced, if not lovingly, at least
knowingly, as a means of assuring citizens a day in court. The argu-
ments against contingency, though vigorously expressed, seem to me,
to fly in the face of our history. They posit an unrealistic communitar-
ian ideal that is not consistent with our past behavior or adversarial
court structure. The result of rejecting our past would be less power
for the weak and less restraint on the powerful. The American peo-
ple, in their wisdom have, apparently, recognized this and been reluc-
tant to tamper with the system we have. 17
17. For example, California Proposition 202 which would have limited contingency fees was
rejected by voters. See B. Drummond Ayers, Jr., Cougars and Lawyers Come Out Ahead in
Propositions on California Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1996, at All.
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